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Note 
 
Loaded Questions: A Suggested Constitutional 
Framework for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms  
Reid Golden 
In 2008, a special police officer named Dick Heller sued the 
District of Columbia because the government denied him per-
mission to keep a handgun in his own home.1 In District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court took up its first gun case 
since the 1930s and ruled that the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms belongs to the individual American citizen, 
not the state governments.2 It specifically held that the 
amendment applies to handguns, at least in the home,3 and 
that self-defense is the core of the Second Amendment right.4 
This decision invalidated a ban on handguns that had stood in 
the District for over thirty years.5 Shortly after Heller, several 
plaintiffs sued the city of Chicago, which had a nearly identical 
handgun ban,6 on the theory that Second Amendment applies 
to the states in addition to the federal government.7 Once 
again, the Court sided with the plaintiffs—average citizens 
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wishes to thank Laura Arneson, Sharon Grawe, and Shana Conklin for their 
honest criticism and helpful suggestions, the staff members of Minnesota Law 
Review—Heather Baird, Anne Bautch, Brian Burke, and Emily Peterson—for 
the long hours they spent making this Note publishable, and Uncle Sam for 
teaching me the discipline necessary to make it through this difficult process. 
Copyright © 2012 by Reid Golden. 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 595. 
 3. Id. at 635. 
 4. Id. at 628–29. 
 5. D.C. CODE § 7-250.02 (LexisNexis 2001) (criminalizing possession of 
handguns not registered in the District prior to September 24, 1976), invali-
dated by Heller, 554 U.S. at 635–36. Heller also invalidated certain provisions 
requiring firearms in the home to be rendered inoperable while not in use. 554 
U.S. at 635. 
 6. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2009), invali-
dated by McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3043 (2010). 
 7. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026–27. 
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seeking the same relief as Mr. Heller.8 In invalidating the Chi-
cago ordinance, the Court not only extended the Second 
Amendment’s protections to the states, but also indicated that 
it does not intend to treat the right to keep and bear arms any 
less favorably than other fundamental rights.9 
There are at least several hundred major gun laws on the 
books at the federal and state levels, and perhaps many more 
than that at the local level.10 The Supreme Court’s declaration 
that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental, individ-
ual right has the potential to alter, in a very real way, the av-
erage American’s right to purchase, sell, possess, and even car-
ry a firearm. It may also limit, perhaps severely, the 
government’s power to make policy decisions regarding guns. 
Who may be denied possession? On what grounds? Are guns 
not allowed in certain places? Where? What types of firearms 
may be prohibited? Can the government enact licensing or reg-
istration schemes? These and other questions have been the 
subject of much speculation.11 With estimates of guns in this 
country running into the hundreds of millions,12 and in light of 
the plethora of recent cases seeking to define the contours of 
the Second Amendment,13 such issues will need to be resolved. 
Sooner or later, the Supreme Court is going to have to re-
fine the scope of the right to keep and bear arms. As lower 
courts render judgments as to the extent and meaning of this 
 
 8. Id. at 3050. 
 9. Id. at 3043 (“[The City of Chicago] must mean . . . that the Second 
Amendment should be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment. We reject that suggestion.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, Twenty Thousand Gun-
Control Laws?, BROOKINGS INST. 2 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www 
.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/gunbook4.pdf. It is not readily known 
how many local gun laws there are. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., David Rittgers, Gun Control After McDonald, CATO @ LIBER-
TY (Mar. 10, 2010, 4:45 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/gun-control-after 
-mcdonald/; Matthew Scarola, Analysis: State Gun Regulations and McDonald, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2010, 10:24 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/ 
analysis-state-gun-regulations-and-mcdonald/. 
 12. E.g., Déjà Vu, All Over Again: “More Guns, Less Crime,” NAT’L RIFLE 
ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.nraila.org/ 
legislation/federal-legislation/2010/d%C3%A9j%C3%A0-vu,-all-over-again-more 
-guns,-l (estimating the number of handguns alone at nearly 100,000,000). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(challenging a law prohibiting users or addicts of controlled substances from 
possessing firearms); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 
2010) (challenging a law denying possession of a firearm to one convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence). 
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right, the high court will be required to correct or affirm these 
decisions as a way of guiding other governmental units in con-
stitutionally enacting, enforcing, and interpreting gun-control 
laws. 
This Note suggests the Court should use First Amendment 
free-speech jurisprudence to guide its future Second Amend-
ment decisions. Part I discusses the current state of Second 
Amendment law, including recent major Supreme Court deci-
sions and certain types of common gun regulations found 
throughout the country. Due to the recent decisions in Heller 
and McDonald, these weapon laws will need to be scrutinized 
in light of the Second Amendment, rather than simply through 
the lens of the states’ police power. However, because the need 
to analyze these laws under the Second Amendment has only 
recently become a requirement, courts will need to either in-
vent entirely new scrutiny doctrines or borrow them from other 
areas of the law. For this reason, the first Section also discuss-
es free-speech doctrines that can be readily converted from the 
First Amendment to apply to the Second Amendment. Part II 
analogizes free speech to self-defense in selecting and applying 
scrutiny tests for various existing and hypothetical gun-control 
laws. Part III argues that courts really only need to apply the 
strict- and intermediate-scrutiny tests as they already exist in 
order to properly adjudicate many of the issues likely to come 
before them—but that they should understand that the im-
portant parts of these tests in the free-speech context may be 
different than what is important in the self-defense context. 
Specifically, this part suggests that both strict and intermedi-
ate scrutiny together are required to properly adjudicate Se-
cond Amendment challenges, and that surprisingly little alter-
ation is needed to usefully adapt these tools from the First 
Amendment context. 
I.  A MANDATE WITHOUT A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ADJUDICATION   
This Part discusses the current state of the law with re-
gard to national and state-level gun control. It begins by dis-
cussing how the Heller14 and McDonald15 decisions will certain-
ly be the foundation upon which future gun-control litigation is 
based. This is followed by a brief synopsis of typical gun-control 
 
 14. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008). 
 15. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3020–50 (2010). 
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laws. Finally, judicial standards for resolving challenges to 
laws on First Amendment grounds will be explained, due to 
their potential applicability in the Second Amendment context. 
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF GUN-CONTROL LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The Supreme Court’s recent landmark cases settled a ma-
jor dispute between two schools of thought on what right the 
Second Amendment protects. First, in Heller, the Court decided 
who holds the right to keep and bear arms: the individual citi-
zen.16 Second, the McDonald Court held that states, and not 
merely the federal government, must respect the Second 
Amendment, and that they are not free to regulate firearms in 
any manner they please.17 While the Court did touch briefly on 
what sorts of regulations are and are not permitted,18 it left 
much of the Second Amendment’s scope to be decided another 
day. 
Gun-control legislation is often enacted at the state level. 
Even following the Heller and McDonald decisions, no further 
challenge to gun-control laws has made its way up to the Su-
preme Court. This Section outlines the background of the laws 
likely to face a challenge on Second Amendment grounds. 
Some states require a permit for mere possession of a fire-
arm (“simple possession”).19 Others require a permit to pur-
chase a gun but do not require one for simple possession.20 Of 
the states requiring permits to possess, most jurisdictions issue 
them based on objective criteria, such as a clean criminal histo-
ry, and issuance is not subject to the discretion of the issuing 
authority.21 Normally the issuance of such a permit is simple, 
inexpensive, and relatively quick, although there are certain 
 
 16. 554 U.S. at 595. 
 17. 130 S. Ct. at 3043. 
 18. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (recognizing that the Second Amendment 
right has limits and indicating that certain types of gun-control laws would 
probably withstand future challenges). 
 19. See, e.g., 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1 (West 2011) (requiring a 
firearm identification card in order to possess a firearm); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
140, § 129C (LexisNexis 2007) (same). 
 20. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.7132 (West 2012) (requiring a permit for 
the purchase of a handgun or military-style rifle). 
 21. See, e.g., ILL. STATE POLICE, APPLICATION FOR FIREARM OWNER’S 
IDENTIFICATION CARD (2012), available at http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/6 
-181x.pdf ( listing only such objective criteria as conditions of issuance). 
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notable exceptions to this general rule.22 Generally, private-
party (non-dealer) sales are subject to only minimal govern-
ment oversight.23 Under federal law, all felons, those convicted 
of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, the mentally in-
competent, addicts, and certain others are prohibited from pos-
sessing firearms.24 
Most states restrict the ability of citizens to carry weapons 
in public.25 Only Illinois, however, has no legal mechanism for 
an ordinary citizen to do so.26 The vast majority of states have 
weapon-carry permit regimes in place that require authorities 
to issue permits to citizens if they meet certain objective crite-
ria.27 Under these “shall-issue” systems, the objective applica-
tion requirements typically include lack of a felony conviction; 
lack of an adjudication of mental incompetence; the procure-
ment of statutorily required training; and payment of a fee, 
among others.28 
Seven states still use restrictive “may-issue” permit sys-
tems.29 The defining characteristic of these permit schemes is 
 
 22. Compare id. (requiring only a simple one-page application, a picture, a 
ten-dollar fee, and approximately thirty days of processing time), with N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 400.00(4-a) (McKinney 2008) (allowing up to six months pro-
cessing time without cause and more time with good cause shown), and N.Y.C. 
POLICE DEP’T, HANDGUN LICENSE APPLICATION (2010), available at http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/permits/HandGunLicenseApplicationForms 
Complete.pdf (requiring a fifteen-page application and nearly $450 in fees). 
 23. See Unlicensed Person Questions, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIRE-
ARMS & EXPLOSIVES, http://www.atf.gov/firearms/faq/unlicensed-persons.html# 
private-record-keeping ( last visited May 16, 2012) (noting that those not in the 
firearms business may sell guns without record-keeping requirements and 
need only follow a few basic laws when doing so, unless more is required by 
state law). 
 24. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.01–.336 (West 2007); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.41.050 (West 2010). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4003–16 
(2009) ( lacking a licensing requirement for public carry and placing virtually 
no place or manner restrictions on the armed citizen). 
 26. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2010). The District of 
Columbia also generally prohibits the carry of firearms outside of the home. 
D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 27. See US State Pages, HANDGUNLAW.US, http://www.handgunlaw.us 
( last updated Feb. 1, 2012) (reviewing state laws to create a map showing that 
most states allow for objectively issued permits or do not require any permit to 
carry a gun in public). 
 28. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(2) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2923.125 (West 2004). 
 29. US State Pages, supra note 27 (indicating states that use may-issue 
permitting systems in beige). Although Alabama is technically a may-issue 
state, Alabama sheriffs now universally dispense with “good cause” require-
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that, in addition to the requirements of the shall-issue systems, 
the issuing authority—typically the local police or county sher-
iff with jurisdiction over the applicant’s residential address—
may make a discretionary decision as to whether an applicant 
should receive the permit, even if all the other requirements 
are fulfilled. Generally, such determinations take the form of 
an issuing authority’s subjective opinion of an applicant’s fit-
ness to carry a firearm in public, whether the applicant has 
shown a satisfactory need to carry a handgun, or both.30 
Typical weapon-carry laws, both shall- and may-issue, 
specify restrictions on the places in which permit holders may 
carry their firearms in public.31 Many states do not allow their 
permit holders to carry guns into the secure areas of airports, 
schools, bars, prisons, private establishments posting signage 
asking that guns not be carried inside, or other sensitive plac-
es.32 States also regularly restrict the manner in which weap-
ons may be carried, most often regulating whether the firearm 
must be concealed from plain view by the licensee and by speci-
fying that they cannot be intoxicated by drugs or alcohol while 
armed.33 Other restrictions exist, particularly under may-issue 
schemes where the permit has been granted only for a limited 
purpose.34 Many states honor the carry permits of at least some 
other states in the same way that they recognize a driver’s li-
cense.35 Applications for permits to carry in public, under both 
 
ments voluntarily and thus function almost identically with shall-issue state 
permit regimes. Shall-Issue, May-Issue, No-Issue and Unrestricted States, 
BUCKEYE FIREARMS ASS’N, http://www.buckeyefirearms.org/node/6744 ( last vis-
ited May 16, 2012).  
 30. E.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13.53-2.3(a) (2007) (requiring the applicant 
to have both “good character” and “a justifiable need to carry a handgun”). 
 31. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 to -.4 (2009). 
 32. E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03 (West Supp. 2010). 
 33. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 624.7142 (2010) (setting penalties for permit hold-
ers who carry handguns while under the influence of alcohol and specifying 
different penalties depending on a person’s blood alcohol concentration); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.035 (penalizing permit holders who intentionally fail 
to keep their handguns concealed). 
 34. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2) (McKinney 2008) (authorizing the 
state to issue several types of permits with various restrictions on where and 
under what circumstances a handgun may be carried, as well as a permit that 
does not contain such restrictions); Letter from Jason A. Guida, Dir. of the 
Firearms Record Bureau, Commonwealth of Mass., to Applicant (Dec. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/chsb/firearms/non-resident 
-application.pdf ( listing potentially applicable restrictions to nonresident ap-
plications for permits). 
 35. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-213 (2010) (recognizing, with certain 
restrictions, any permit from another state that recognizes a Colorado permit); 
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may- and shall-issue systems, are almost always more compli-
cated, time-consuming, and expensive to complete than the 
analogous laws governing the simple possession of firearms.36 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONTEXT 
As noted earlier, with the Supreme Court clarification that 
gun laws placing restrictions on individuals must be scruti-
nized in light of the Second Amendment, some framework for 
the invalidation of impermissibly broad gun-control laws must 
be adopted by the courts.37 In Heller, the Supreme Court hinted 
that it may borrow First Amendment doctrines to adjudicate 
the permissibility of firearm regulations.38 Several lower courts 
have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and decided cases in 
light of First Amendment principles—most visibly, the doc-
trines of strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.39 For this 
reason, these doctrines and their attendant considerations are 
summarized in this Section. 
Strict scrutiny is a test reserved for core elements of First 
Amendment rights, such as freedom from governmental sup-
pression of speech.40 This test places an onerous burden on the 
government to justify a law that purports to allow it to directly 
 
IND. CODE § 35-47-2-21 (LexisNexis 2009) (recognizing permits from all other 
states). 
 36. Compare OHIO STATE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF OHIO APPLICATION FOR 
LICENSE TO CARRY A CONCEALED HANDGUN (2011), available at http:// 
www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/files/Forms/Forms-for-Law-Enforcement/Crime 
-and-Violence-Prevention/Standard-Concealed-Carry-License-App-.aspx (re-
quiring a four-page application, training, fees, extensive questioning, and 
more before a permit will be issued), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2923.20(a)(1) (West 2004) (requiring only that firearms not be “recklessly” 
sold to prohibited persons). 
 37. See infra Part I.A. 
 38. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582, 591 & n.14, 595, 
606, 620 n.23, 626, 635 (drawing several parallels between the First and Se-
cond Amendments). 
 39. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 706–08 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(examining the applicability of both tests in the Second Amendment context); 
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
some level of scrutiny is required to evaluate a law denying possession of a 
firearm to one convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence). 
 40. See R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting that 
proscription of speech based on disagreement with the message is a presump-
tively invalid use of government power); Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members 
of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115–16 (1991) (noting that tax-
es or other regulations based on the content of expression will normally con-
flict with the First Amendment (citing Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc., v. Ragland, 
481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987))). 
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infringe on these core rights. The doctrine of strict scrutiny 
presumes the governmental regulation invalid.41 In order to 
overcome this presumption, the government must show that its 
regulation serves a “compelling” state interest, and in addition, 
that this interest is served in the way that is least burdensome 
to the restricted First Amendment activity.42 The level of im-
portance of the government interest at stake is a key factor be-
cause the courts do not lightly declare government interests 
“compelling.”43 
Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, requires only 
that the government tread carefully when enacting laws that, 
although not directly abridging core civil liberties, nevertheless 
impose practical burdens on those seeking to exercise their 
rights. Where, for example, the government seeks not to regu-
late First Amendment rights themselves and instead enacts 
policies that—while burdening those rights—serve other legit-
imate purposes, the courts apply intermediate review to the 
challenged laws.44 Even where free speech is at its most pro-
tected, such as on a public street, the government may place 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on the expres-
sive activity in order to achieve these secondary goals.45 When 
the government does so, the law will normally be subjected only 
to intermediate scrutiny.46 
When applying intermediate scrutiny, a court will first ask 
if the government had the constitutional power to pass the 
law.47 If it did, the regulation needs to further an “important” 
state interest unrelated to the suppression of speech.48 Unlike 
 
 41. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. 
 42. Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 231. 
 43. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 119–21 (preventing 
criminals from profiting from their crimes, at least through the selective sei-
zure of book profits as opposed to other assets, is insufficient grounds to regu-
late in a content-based manner); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. 
Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983) (raising taxes is insufficient 
grounds for content-based regulations); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 
(1980) (holding that the right to privacy is insufficient grounds for content-
based regulation). 
 44. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (requiring 
that the government interest be unrelated to the suppression of speech in or-
der for intermediate scrutiny to apply). 
 45. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 46. See id. at 798 (noting that the O’Brien test is the appropriate review of 
the government’s reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on speech). 
 47. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 48. Id. 
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strict scrutiny, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that the state does not face a high bar justifying a government 
interest as “important.”49 The burden imposed by the law must 
still be no broader than necessary to advance the interest in 
question, and importantly, the speaker must still have ample 
alternative opportunity to deliver his or her message.50 
Thus, at least in the arena of the First Amendment, the 
deference given to the government in making and enforcing its 
laws is low, and judicial oversight is high, when fundamental 
rights are directly burdened. In contrast, the courts give great-
er leeway to the passage and enforcement of restrictions that 
incidentally burden these rights. Because of the great disparity 
in the difficulty of overcoming these two different tests, liti-
gants have big incentives to persuade the courts to apply the 
level of scrutiny most beneficial to their litigation objectives. 
One major determinant of how to scrutinize gun-control 
laws—namely the declaration that the Second Amendment in 
general and the right to self-defense in particular are funda-
mental rights—was settled in McDonald.51 However, other key 
questions remain unanswered with respect to common state 
gun restrictions, such as when a state’s need for weapon re-
strictions becomes important or even compelling, whether the 
right to self-defense extends beyond an individual’s home, and 
whether certain burdens on the self-defense right are direct or 
incidental. The next Part analyzes how well the strict- and in-
termediate-scrutiny doctrines are suited to test various major 
gun-control laws now on the books. 
 
 49. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 
683 (1992) (finding that the government has an important interest in enacting 
regulations so that passengers at airport terminals do not have to alter their 
walking paths to avoid religious solicitors); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 650 & n.13 (1981) (noting that convenience of the 
fairgoers and even managing the flow of a crowd at government fairgrounds 
were important interests for purposes of intermediate scrutiny); Smith v. City 
of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that protection 
of business from beggars annoying customers on the beach is an important 
state interest). 
 50. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (elaborating on 
the requirement of leaving open ample alternative methods of communication). 
 51. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3043 (2010) (rejecting 
the suggestion that the Second Amendment should be treated less favorably 
by the Court than other provisions contained in the Bill of Rights). 
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II.  ANALYSIS OF STRICT- AND INTERMEDIATE-
SCRUTINY TESTS IN THE GUN-CONTROL CONTEXT   
Not long after the Supreme Court decided Heller, commen-
tators began calling for a decision as to what constitutional test 
should be used to determine the validity of gun-control laws.52 
The language in Heller itself precludes the possibility of ration-
al basis review,53 leaving most interested parties to wrangle over 
whether strict or intermediate scrutiny should apply. This Part 
uses examples of current gun regulations to analyze the appro-
priateness of each test, ultimately concluding that neither test 
alone is sufficient to adjudicate challenges to gun regulations. 
Strict scrutiny is a difficult doctrine for a governmental 
unit to legislate or enforce its laws under, and as such, a flat 
declaration that all gun-control laws should be scrutinized us-
ing this test would certainly lead to a more robust Second 
Amendment.54 However, such severe protection for gun rights 
would be well out of step with other civil-liberties jurispru-
dence,55 and would likely lead to results unacceptable to all but 
the most extreme gun-rights advocates. In any event, the Court 
has clearly signaled that many types of current gun regulations 
may well be permissible—language that casts serious doubt on 
the possibility the Court will adopt blanket application of strict 
scrutiny in future Second Amendment cases.56 This is not to 
say that strict scrutiny categorically fails to properly answer 
Second Amendment questions—indeed it answers some quite 
eloquently—but the analysis will show that strict scrutiny 
alone is not well suited to answer all Second Amendment ques-
tions likely to come before the Court. 
Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, recognizes that 
even fundamental rights must give way to other reasonable 
 
 52. See, e.g., Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulation Af-
ter Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1156–60 (2011) (arguing that 
except in rare circumstances, intermediate scrutiny should apply). See gener-
ally Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which 
Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
437 (2011) (presenting two scholars’ viewpoints regarding which standard of 
scrutiny should apply to the Second Amendment). 
 53. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 & n.27 (2008). 
 54. See generally R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) 
(striking down an ordinance that prohibited hate speech because it failed 
strict scrutiny). 
 55. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (noting that even restrictions on speech are 
not always subject to strict scrutiny). 
 56. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26 ( listing several types of broad gun 
regulations that are “presumptively lawful”). 
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needs of society.57 The lower burden imposed by intermediate 
scrutiny merely requires the government to legislate carefully 
in its attempt to realize those societal needs in order to make 
sure that the burdens are imposed for an important reason and 
that the prohibitions do not swallow up a meaningful oppor-
tunity to exercise the right.58 The Supreme Court noted in Hel-
ler and McDonald that it did not intend to let its recognition of 
the Second Amendment as a fundamental right snuff out rea-
sonable gun-control legislation, and intermediate scrutiny of 
these laws will certainly allow for that result.59 Nevertheless, 
this test alone is improper for—and in fact, incapable of—
protecting the core Second Amendment right of self-defense. 
A. STRICT SCRUTINY VS. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: FIREARM 
DISABILITIES BASED ON CRIMINAL HISTORY  
One of the simplest and most common types of gun-control 
laws in the United States are laws that place a lifetime prohibi-
tion on convicted criminals from possessing a firearm.60 The 
theory is that if a person has shown that he or she cannot be 
trusted to obey the law, then society certainly does not want 
him or her to have access to a gun because of the serious poten-
tial that such a person may cause severe harm.61 In strict scru-
tiny terms, this argument is a public-safety justification that 
the government would hypothetically attempt to characterize 
as “compelling” to a reviewing court. It should be obvious that, 
unlike in the First Amendment context, the government will 
not always have a difficult time convincing a court that such a 
public safety justification is a compelling-government interest 
able to withstand strict scrutiny.62 
 
 57. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99 (upholding an ordinance that al-
lowed government officials to restrict the volume of a message to preserve the 
peace and quiet of the surrounding neighborhood). 
 58. Id. at 791. 
 59. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 60. See, e.g., Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (prohibit-
ing anyone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one 
year in jail from possessing a firearm). 
 61. See David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical 
and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 590 (1987) (explaining that the 
impetus for the first major federal gun-control legislation in the United States 
stemmed from prohibition-era gangsters’ effective and deadly use of subma-
chine guns and sawed-off shotguns). 
 62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that in gun cas-
es, the government should theoretically have little trouble justifying a compel-
ling interest in public safety in the strict-scrutiny context). 
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That said, the right to self-defense is now considered fun-
damental.63 Because lifetime possession bans for criminals are 
a direct infringement on the core self-defense right,64 courts 
should not readily accept government contentions that all crim-
inality raises public safety concerns serious enough to justify 
this direct burden on Second Amendment rights. Infringements 
on fundamental rights, even—and perhaps especially—for un-
popular groups, deserve careful review by the judiciary when 
the government attempts to abridge them.65 
While it is relatively uncontroversial to say that criminals 
need to be punished, it is quite clear that the Constitution 
would not permit the permanent removal of other fundamental 
rights, such as the right to speak freely or the right to a trial by 
jury, even for those who have been previously convicted of very 
serious crimes.66 Nevertheless, the right to bear arms presents 
special dangers from its misuse that these other rights do not. 
There may be good reason to permanently strip gun rights from 
some individuals, but the fundamental nature of the right to 
bear arms means that courts should require some minimum 
level of criminality before accepting as compelling any public-
safety justifications the government advances. Indeed, it seems 
logical for courts to require a connection between an offender’s 
past criminal behavior and the future probability he or she will 
cause harm if given access to a firearm, before courts deem a 
public safety argument by the government compelling. 
This is not to say that a detailed, fact-specific inquiry is 
needed in the case of every defendant.67 Rather, when criminal 
history is used as a justification for a law denying firearms 
rights to convicted offenders, the courts could look to how the 
 
 63. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (concluding 
that since the Second Amendment is a fundamental right, it must be incorpo-
rated against the states).  
 64. Even under the narrowest reading of Heller, a lifetime ban on simple 
possession is most certainly a direct infringement on the core Second Amend-
ment right of self-defense because one subject to such a disability can never 
again possess a firearm. 
 65. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3019 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that special considerations are normally required 
for unpopular groups in the First Amendment context). 
 66. Even the ability to disenfranchise criminals, while an equally severe 
sanction, is explicitly supported by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 2. 
 67. See R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (analyz-
ing the strict-scrutiny test in terms of the law in question, rather than the in-
dividual who the law affects). 
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law operates, taking into account such factors as whether the 
law affects offenders whose predicate crime is one of violence; 
whether the offense is a felony; and whether the convict is a re-
peat offender. These factors can assist courts in determining 
whether a challenged law is likely to prevent the misuse of a 
firearm in the future.68 The analysis of these kinds of factors 
will provide a simple way for courts to assess whether the gov-
ernment’s offered justification for a particular law is truly  
compelling. 
For example, few would argue that repeat, violent felons 
should be allowed to possess a gun. Such offenders have shown 
not only that they have the capacity to commit serious crimes of 
violence, but also that they have not changed their ways even 
after being sentenced to a presumably serious punishment.69 
Even in the case of a first-time violent felony offender, although 
the criminal has not necessarily shown a propensity to repeat 
his behavior, violent felonies are generally regarded by society 
as the most reviled infractions of our criminal codes.70 The risk 
of allowing such a person access to firearms is too great to re-
quire the government to place much faith in his rehabilita-
tion.71 Thus, in this scenario, the state interest in preventing 
such a person from obtaining a firearm would certainly be com-
pelling72 because the connection between past behavior and fu-
ture risk is clear. 
On the flipside, nonviolent misdemeanants present a simi-
larly easy case. Such criminals simply do not present the same 
 
 68. These are not the only possible factors to consider. For example, predi-
cate convictions linked to organized crime or to drug distribution may demon-
strate a connection between past behavior and future fear of firearm misuse 
sufficient to justify a state denying such convicts access to firearms. 
 69. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(2) (1962) (defining felonies as crimes 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death). 
 70. Most state death penalty statutes require commission of a violent fel-
ony, usually murder. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.105 (West Supp. 
2010) (allowing for the death penalty for aggravated murder). 
 71. See generally PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (finding that over 
sixty percent of prisoners convicted of a violent crime were rearrested for a 
new crime within three years of their release and that the subsequent crime 
almost always involved a serious misdemeanor or felony). 
 72. See generally Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118–19 (1991) (asserting that the State has a com-
pelling interest in “ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those 
who harm them” and “ensuring that criminals do not profit from their 
crimes”). 
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danger to society that their violent-felon counterparts do.73 Alt-
hough these offenders certainly need to be held accountable for 
their crimes—and may even pose a significant threat of recidi-
vism74—where they have chosen to leave violence out of the 
equation, the State should not so easily brush their fundamen-
tal right to defend themselves aside. Laws permanently abridg-
ing their Second Amendment rights would not make a suffi-
cient showing that the fear of future firearm misuse is 
reasonably grounded in such minor, limited past misconduct, 
and courts should reject government assertions that the public 
safety interest as to those convicts is compelling.75 
The harder cases, not surprisingly, fall in between these 
two extremes. A nonviolent felon, for example, doubtless re-
quires serious punishment—perhaps even very serious pun-
ishment—for his or her crime.76 However, this need is met 
through sentencing.77 Lenient judicial review of laws collateral-
ly impairing the fundamental right to self-defense, however, 
are not justified if the offender does not show any propensity 
for violence in general or the misuse of a firearm in particular. 
Where the connection between an offender’s past crime and fu-
ture potential to misuse a gun is lacking, even in a felony case, 
courts should again reject a contention that a lifetime posses-
sion ban serves a compelling state interest. 
Arguably the closest call between the societal need for safe-
ty and respect for fundamental Second Amendment rights man-
ifests itself in the case of the violent misdemeanant. Here, only 
one factor, violence, is present. Violence is the single most com-
 
 73. Cf. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden 
Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 271, 273 n.5 (2009) (discussing FBI arrest statistics for minor, nonvi-
olent crimes). Infractions for disorderly conduct, drunkenness, vandalism, cur-
few, loitering, liquor law infractions, and other minor crimes account for near-
ly twelve million of the fourteen million tracked arrests. Id.  
 74. Chol Daniel Kim, Chapter 16: Expanding the Pilot Program that As-
sists Indigent Inmates After Release, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 459, 464 (2009) 
(noting significant recidivism rates among misdemeanor offenders, particular-
ly if no jail time is served). 
 75. Laws categorically denying firearms rights to nonviolent misdemean-
ants are rare, if they exist at all. Such a law is proposed here as a hypothetical 
to round out the strict-scrutiny analysis. 
 76. See Zachery Kouwe, Fraud Victims Want Maximum for Madoff, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2009, at B3 (recounting losses resulting from Bernard 
Madoff ’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme). 
 77. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1 (discussing the imposition of a 150-year sentence 
on Bernard Madoff, despite his advanced age). 
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pelling reason to permanently prohibit firearm possession be-
cause of the serious harm that a propensity for violence, cou-
pled with access to firearms, can cause.78 The ability of gov-
ernment to deny civil rights to persons convicted of serious 
crimes, whether or not violent, has long been established.79 
Given the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, however, the judi-
ciary should take a skeptical view of laws purporting to deny 
those convicted of a single crime of misdemeanor violence from 
ever possessing a firearm and demand more justification from 
the government before it is allowed to exercise such a severe  
sanction. 
The classification of a crime as a misdemeanor is the tradi-
tional expression of society’s decision not to brand the criminal 
harshly.80 If this is what society has decided, then a subsequent 
decision to collaterally punish an offender through permanent 
removal of fundamental Second Amendment rights becomes 
suspect.81 The nature of a misdemeanor conviction indicates 
both that the criminal is not a serious danger to others and is 
not deserving of serious punishment.82 Under these circum-
stances, the public safety interest probably falls short of  
compelling.83 
 
 78. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (taking no-
tice of the problem presented by handgun violence in the United States). 
 79. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS 
1–5 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf (discuss-
ing the general ability of the state and federal governments to impose civil 
disabilities on convicted criminals).  
 80. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6)–(8) (2006) (defining as misdemeanors 
crimes punishable by as little as five days of incarceration); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 79 (referring throughout to the imposition of civil disabili-
ties by the state and federal governments only for felonies). 
 81. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (finding that although the Second Amend-
ment protects an important individual right, that right has its limits, and in-
dicating that the longstanding prohibitions on felons possessing firearms are 
likely to remain viable into the future). By implication, laws denying possession 
to misdemeanants would then rest on shakier constitutional ground. See id.  
 82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6)–(8). 
 83. One notable point of contention is the current federal lifetime posses-
sion ban on anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and 
its state analogues. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). Re-
cently, some courts have attempted to reconcile this issue through various 
methods of justification, not the least of which is that if the assault had been 
perpetrated against a stranger, it would have been a felony; yet, it is only a 
misdemeanor when committed against a family member. See, e.g., United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2010). Whether the proper solu-
tion to this issue is for states to rebrand these crimes as felonies if they want 
to ban domestic abusers from firearm possession, or to carve out a special ex-
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If a violent misdemeanant repeats his or her crimes, how-
ever, society now has additional concerns. If the criminal com-
mits a series of violent offenses, although of only moderate se-
verity, courts should not zealously protect that individual’s 
fundamental rights in the hope that his or her crimes will not 
eventually become more harmful. The serious risk that this 
kind of offender will eventually use a weapon in the course of 
his or her violence justifies recognition of the State’s compelling 
interest in denying that individual access to a firearm.84 
Application of the intermediate-scrutiny test to any life-
time possession ban ignores the obvious fact that such statutes 
are a direct, rather than incidental, burden on one’s Second 
Amendment rights. This makes intermediate scrutiny inappli-
cable in the first instance.85 While some might argue that the 
main goal of these laws is societal safety, and that the burden 
to criminals is an incidental consequence of those laws, such an 
argument does no more than semantically recast the justifica-
tion for the societal interest at stake into an assertion that the 
burden to the right is indirect. 
This would be akin to arguing that a law forbidding any 
news coverage of the 2008 market crash would not be suppres-
sion of speech, but rather an attempt to prevent an economic 
meltdown by putting an “incidental” burden on the press’s free-
speech rights. The problem becomes even clearer when these 
lifetime-possession bans are tested under the “meaningful al-
ternative opportunity” prong of the intermediate-scrutiny test. 
Indeed, there is expressly never going to be any opportunity for 
someone subjected to a lifetime ban on simple possession to 
meaningfully exercise his or her Second Amendment right to 
self-defense.86 The absolute inapplicability either of these parts 
of the test to such laws highlights the inability of intermediate 
scrutiny to properly adjudicate their constitutionality. 
One’s criminal background is of grave concern to the gov-
ernment when that person attempts to obtain possession of a 
 
ception in Second Amendment jurisprudence for such criminals is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
 84. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT FEL-
ONS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/vfluc.pdf (finding that although fifty-six percent of violent fel-
ons had a prior conviction record, only fifteen percent had a conviction for a 
prior violent felony). 
 85. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (de-
scribing the intermediate-scrutiny test in terms of incidental burdens). 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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firearm.87 The need of society to keep guns out of the hands of 
serious criminals is great.88 Despite this need, where funda-
mental rights are concerned, the government should not be giv-
en leave by courts to over solve this problem at the expense of 
individuals who, despite some poor choices, do not truly repre-
sent a threat of violence to others. When criminal history is the 
justification for permanent removal of Second Amendment 
rights, the burden to society is small when the courts require 
the government to exclude minor and nonviolent offenders from 
the scope of such laws. 
As discussed below, because strict scrutiny is not “automat-
ically” fatal in the Second Amendment context—and indeed 
leads to results largely consistent with the current state of the 
law—there is little reason to fear that its application to bans 
based on criminal history will leave violent criminals able to le-
gally purchase firearms. 
B. STRICT SCRUTINY VS. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: LICENSING 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMPLE POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 
Some states require licensure for simple possession of a 
firearm,89 and almost every state requires a license to carry a 
firearm in public.90 Normally, application procedures are sim-
ple, inexpensive, and the delay prior to issuance is short.91 
Permits for public carry of firearms are almost always more 
complicated, more expensive, and take longer to issue than 
permits for simple possession.92 Nevertheless, even applications 
for public carry permits normally require only a few pages,93 
 
 87. See, e.g., Michael Luo, Guns in Public, and out of Sight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 2011, at A1 (documenting the serious consequences of allowing crimi-
nals access to firearms). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1 (West Supp. 2011); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129C (LexisNexis 2007). 
 90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9.41.050 (West 2010). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 et. seq. 
(2009) ( lacking a licensing requirement for public carry and placing virtually 
no place or manner restrictions on the armed citizen). 
 91. See, e.g., ILL. STATE POLICE, supra note 22. 
 92. See supra note 36. 
 93. See, e. g., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., APPLICATION FOR A PENNSYLVANIA 
LICENSE TO CARRY FIREARMS (2007), available at http://www.co.centre.pa.us/ 
sheriff/license_to_carry.pdf (requiring a two-page application); WIS. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, APPLICATION FOR CONCEALED WEAPON LICENSE (2011), available at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/ConcealedCarry/concealed-carry-application 
-11-11.pdf (requiring a five-page application, four of which are either instruc-
tions or legal reminders). 
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rarely cost more than $100,94 and are frequently issued within 
thirty, sixty, or sometimes ninety days.95 Some states, however, 
make the administrative procedures extremely expensive, con-
fusing, or complicated, and impose onerous waiting periods pri-
or to issuance—even for permits for simple possession.96 
Whether a law that requires licensing for simple posses-
sion should be subjected to review under strict or intermediate 
scrutiny can be somewhat more complicated than determining 
how other laws should be scrutinized. This is because it may 
not be readily apparent if the questioned licensing procedures 
amount only to an incidental burden, or to a direct infringe-
ment on the Second Amendment. For example, a law may re-
quire that an applicant wishing to purchase a handgun must 
fill out a one page form, pay a small (or no) fee, and wait for the 
license to arrive in the mail.97 Minnesota, which has such a 
law, requires that the issuing authority make a determination 
within a set period of time—seven days.98 In the event that a 
license is not approved in this time period, or if it is denied, the 
applicant can avail him or herself of effective procedural  
protections.99 
New Jersey has a law facially similar to that in Minnesota, 
but it does not require the issuing authority to approve or deny 
the application within any set period of time.100 The New Jer-
sey law also allows for a denial based on extremely vague 
standards, such as if the applicant is not considered to possess 
“good character and good repute in the community in which he 
 
 94. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(3)(f ) (West 2012) (allowing the 
sheriff to charge actual costs of issuing the permit, not to exceed $100); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.291(5)(a) (West 2011) (totaling $65 in fees). 
 95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(6)(c) (West 2011) (requiring issu-
ance, denial, or request for further information within ninety days of applica-
tion); § 166.292(1) (requiring issuance of approved applications within forty-
five days). 
 96. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(4-a) (McKinney 2012) (allowing up to six 
months processing time without cause, and more time with good cause shown); 
N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 22 (requiring a fifteen-page application and 
nearly $450 in fees). 
 97. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.7132 (West 2012) (requiring a permit 
for the purchase of a handgun or military-style rifle). 
 98. Id. § 624.7132 subdiv. 4. 
 99. Id. § 624.7132 subdiv. 13 (allowing individuals denied permits a hear-
ing to review the sheriff ’s decision to deny the permit). 
 100. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3 (West 2011) (failing to specify any time 
limitations on the decision to approve or deny the application); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 13:54-1.4 (2011) (same). 
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lives,”101 or if “the issuance would not be in the interest of the 
public health, safety or welfare.”102 Like Minnesota, New Jer-
sey requires the police to inform the applicant of the reason for 
a denial and allows for an appeal if the police deny the applica-
tion.103 But without any requirement that the police issue the 
permit within a reasonable period of time, it is unclear at what 
point, if ever, a failure to issue confers standing to appeal such 
inaction on the grounds it should be considered a denial. This 
leaves applicants on uncertain footing if the police fail to either 
issue or deny the permit, no matter how long ago they ap-
plied.104 And although a New Jersey applicant must be in-
formed of the reasons for a denial, the police are also free to 
make informal investigations and use subjective determina-
tions to deny these permits.105 Thus, even if one does appeal a 
denial under this scheme, the applicant is really only trading 
the subjective opinion of the police for the subjective opinion of 
the court—which gives great deference to the subjective deter-
minations of the police officials that initially deny the per-
mit.106 
Other licensing regimes are easier to classify as direct in-
fringements. For example, New York expressly allows six 
months for approval of a permit for simple possession, and ex-
tensions are available for cause.107 Its application packet is fif-
teen pages long and costs nearly $450 to complete.108 Independ-
ent of any state interests that might be advanced in support of 
such a licensing regime, whether they are ultimately justified 
or not, it is difficult to say that licensing procedures such as 
these do not significantly interfere with citizens’ ability to exer-
cise their Second Amendment rights. 
Ultimately, the proper standard of review will depend on 
the purpose and effect of the licensing law. If the purpose or ef-
 
 101. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(c). 
 102. Id. § 2C:58-3(c)(5). 
 103. ADMIN. § 13:54-1.12. 
 104. See id. (failing to offer any appeal process absent an explicit permit 
denial); cf. In re Application of Boyadjian, 828 A.2d 946, 955 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 2003) (noting that police authorities have broad, informal discretion in 
conducting investigations as to the fitness of particular individuals to own a 
handgun). 
 105. See Boyadjian, 828 A.2d at 955–56 (noting that police investigations of 
an applicant’s fitness to own a firearm deserve deference and that police de-
terminations in this regard are “presumptively reliable”). 
 106. See id. 
 107. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(4-a) (McKinney 2008). 
 108. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 22.  
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fect is not to obstruct gun ownership in terms of waiting time, 
expense, complication, or other barriers, then the law need only 
be defended under the intermediate-scrutiny standard.109 
Where a licensure law imposes serious hurdles to gun owner-
ship, then the restrictions—justified or not—should be defend-
ed in terms of strict scrutiny.110 
C. STRICT SCRUTINY VS. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: TIME, 
PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS 
Even in the First Amendment context, laws that would or-
dinarily be subject to strict scrutiny are sometimes held to a 
less stringent level of review.111 One of the most thoroughly de-
veloped of these doctrines is the Supreme Court’s allowance of 
governmental regulation executed in a reasonable time, place, 
or manner.112 So long as the government seeks to serve an in-
terest that is unrelated to the suppression of speech, it may 
nevertheless burden speech in its mission to achieve that inter-
est if the regulation is reasonable.113 
Similar reasoning is applicable in the context of the Second 
Amendment. There may well be times that the right to possess 
a firearm for self-defense reasonably gives way to other im-
portant needs of society. In cases where a gun regulation falls 
short of direct infringement on the core self-defense right, 
courts should only subject those laws to intermediate scruti-
ny.114 So long as such indirect burdens advance important gov-
 
 109. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010) (noting that 
strict scrutiny is the appropriate test when serious hurdles, such as censorship 
based on the speaker or the message content, are implicated “whether by de-
sign or inadvertence”). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding 
that even in a public forum such as a park—where First Amendment rights 
are generally most strongly protected—government regulation may neverthe-
less be subjected to mere intermediate review provided that the regulation is 
not content based). 
 112. See id. at 803 (holding that the government’s sound-amplification 
guideline reasonably regulated the place and manner of expression); see also, 
e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (affirming an appellate decision 
that certain regulations on abortion protesters were reasonable as to their 
time, place, and manner and therefore properly subject only to the Ward in-
termediate scrutiny test); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) 
(recognizing that expressive conduct, in this case nude dancing, may be regu-
lated and subjected to less than strict scrutiny when the governmental goal is 
something other than suppression of that expression). 
 113. E.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 114. See id. (describing the intermediate-scrutiny test in terms of inci-
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ernment interests, the restrictions are not overly broad, and 
citizens retain meaningful opportunities to vindicate their self-
defense rights, then the regulations should survive constitu-
tional challenges under this standard.115 
1. Time Restrictions 
The time restrictions in the First Amendment context are 
often enacted by laws whose purpose is to preserve the peace 
and quiet of others.116 Those exercising their Second Amend-
ment rights, however, do not tend to disrupt the peace and qui-
et of those trying to sleep or enjoy a park.117 Even the discharge 
of a firearm is unlikely, as a practical matter, to have this effect 
because outdoor shooting ranges are purposefully remote, and 
indoor shooting ranges are often designed to control the escape 
of sound.118 Nevertheless, time restrictions on the discharge of 
firearms impose such a minor burden on gun owners that even 
in state laws that preempt nearly all other local regulation of 
firearms, a common exception to these restrictions typically al-
lows local government to regulate, among other things, the 
time of day when a gun may be fired.119 
While it would seem intuitive that part of the right to self-
defense would include maintaining proficiency with the weapon 
 
dental burdens on protected interests). 
 115. See id. But see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) 
(referring to self-defense, or “the individual right to possess and carry weapons 
in case of confrontation,” as the core purpose of the Second Amendment right). 
 116. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 785–86 (upholding such a restriction 
promulgated by the City of New York to deal with concert noise issues). 
 117. This assertion simply refers to the act of carrying a weapon on one’s 
person for the purpose of self-defense—probably concealed—while going about 
one’s business. Firing or even brandishing a firearm in a public place, without 
the rare justification presented in a legitimate self-defense scenario, is of 
course lawless and not an individual right within the meaning of the Second 
Amendment.  
 118. See J. HERNANDEZ ET AL., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DEVELOPMENT 
OF RANGE DESIGN ELEMENTS AND QUALITY CONTROL/QUALITY ASSURANCE 
GUIDANCE TO REDUCE MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ON TRAINING RANGES 
2–3 (2006), available at http://www.cecer.army.mil/techreports/ERDC-CERL_ 
CR-06-3/ERDC-CERL_CR-06-3.pdf (noting the remoteness of outdoor ranges); 
Firing Range, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE STAFF, NAT’L INST. BLDG. 
SCIS., http://www.wbdg.org/design/firing_range.php ( last updated June 20, 
2011) (noting design considerations as key to mitigating the transmission of 
noise outside the range). 
 119. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.633(a) (West 2008) (allowing regulation of 
the discharge of firearms at the municipality level); see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 62.1-01-03 (2010) (failing to preempt local governments from regulating the 
discharge of firearms in the first place). 
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to be used in a self-defense encounter,120 society does have an 
interest in maintaining the peace and quiet of its neighbor-
hoods, particularly at night when people are trying to sleep.121 
A local law prohibiting nighttime shooting practice, for exam-
ple, would advance that interest although it would burden the 
right to self-defense. However, such an imposition is both min-
imal and allows for ample alternative opportunity for the 
armed citizen to maintain proficiency—namely any time during 
the day. This type of incidental restriction fits perfectly into in-
termediate-scrutiny jurisprudence. Application of strict scruti-
ny to a law like this is unwarranted because the incidental na-
ture of the burden to the self-defense right is so clear, and the 
rigors of that test would work an undue hardship on the gov-
ernment in seeking to accommodate society’s other reasonable 
needs.122 
The same restriction on the possession of a self-defense 
weapon at night, however, probably creates a direct and severe 
burden on the right to self-defense by preventing a meaningful 
opportunity for citizens to protect themselves at a time of day 
well-known for its incidence of criminal attack.123 If the gov-
ernment were to pass such a law, the direct nature of its bur-
den would no longer allow for intermediate scrutiny.124 It is un-
clear what compelling societal interest would be at stake in 
preventing citizens from defending themselves at any particu-
lar time of day, but if one was offered by the government, it 
may be able to survive a challenge, though it should subjected 
to the judiciary’s more stringent test.  
 
 120. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
strongly that training and practice with firearms is protected by the Second 
Amendment). 
 121. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 792 (discussing the government’s desire to pro-
tect the character of residential areas and the “more sedate activities” that oc-
cur there). 
 122. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting the 
presumptive invalidity of laws subjected to strict scrutiny). 
 123. See RACHEL BOBA, CRIME ANALYSIS AND CRIME MAPPING 196 fig.11.8 
(2005) (indicating that a majority of robberies occur between the hours of 6 
p.m. and 2 a.m.); Offense Analysis: United States 2005–2009, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION tbl.7 (Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/ 
table_07.html (indicating that in 2009, for example, nearly fifty-four percent of 
burglaries occurred either at nighttime or at an unknown time of day). 
 124. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (describing the intermediate-scrutiny test 
only in terms of incidental burdens on protected rights). 
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2. Place Restrictions 
Place restrictions in the First Amendment context may be 
enacted for a variety of reasons. The government may wish to 
curb expressive activity on its business property,125 it may fear 
the enhanced risk of criminal activity arising from certain 
types of speech activities in some places,126 or it may wish to 
protect captive audiences from receiving messages they do not 
want to hear,127 among others. The key to the constitutionality 
of these incidental restrictions is that the countervailing socie-
tal interest in the prohibition is important and still affords the 
speaker a meaningful opportunity to reach the intended audi-
ence (if they are willing to hear it).128 If the law regulates the 
content of a message, or does not allow the speaker a meaning-
ful, alternative opportunity to deliver it, the restriction will be 
classified as speech suppression by the courts, and must sur-
vive—if at all—under the strict-scrutiny test.129 
Place restrictions in the Second Amendment context, in 
contrast to time restrictions, are quite likely to be a point of 
contention in upcoming challenges to gun-control laws. With 
the Supreme Court declaration that self-defense is the core 
component of the Second Amendment,130 the question must be 
asked: If the right to self-defense is so important, should indi-
viduals then be able to take a gun with them wherever they go?  
Nearly every state has a general prohibition on the carry-
ing of loaded firearms on one’s person, but forty-nine states al-
low citizens to carry weapons outside of their homes.131 States 
 
 125. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (noting that 
when the government acts as a business owner rather than a lawmaker, its 
actions will be subjected to significantly less judicial scrutiny). 
 126. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.60(a)(3) (2011) 
(citing, in a typical metropolitan antibegging ordinance, fear of criminal attack 
as one reason to prohibit certain panhandling activities in listed city locations). 
 127. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) 
(“While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to 
listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of de-
clining to receive it.”). 
 128. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (noting that the government may impose 
reasonable restrictions on protected speech if there is still ample opportunity 
for a speaker to communicate his or her message). 
 129. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting 
that content-based regulations on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are 
“presumptively invalid”). 
 130. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). 
 131. See US State Pages, supra note 27 (indicating in red the jurisdictions 
that both do not issue such permits and also generally prohibit the carrying of 
firearms in public).  
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that follow this regime almost universally have a list of prohib-
ited places where permits to carry a gun are not valid and the 
default rules of prohibition apply.132 This Note examines a few 
of the more common restrictions on place here and makes sug-
gestions as to whether the restrictions should be subjected to 
strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
Of the most common restrictions on places where permit 
holders are not allowed to take their weapons, sensitive areas 
are perhaps the least controversial.133 This category includes 
the secure portion of airports, jails, police stations, court hous-
es, and the like.134 In each of these places, not only is there a 
strong government interest in keeping weapons out, but securi-
ty is also normally very tight in these kinds of locations.135 Alt-
hough laws prohibiting weapons in these places would probably 
even survive strict scrutiny, because the burden here is limited 
and indirect to the core self-defense right, the proper test is in-
termediate scrutiny. 
Where the government interest in prohibiting weapons is 
so strong as to be manifested by its willingness to provide 
weapon screening and armed security at the place in ques-
tion—and because a permit holder is free to rearm themselves 
once they leave a sensitive place—carry restrictions in sensitive 
places should have little trouble passing intermediate scrutiny. 
Another standard place restriction is at “crowded events.” 
This includes crowded sporting events, parades, demonstra-
tions, or other similarly crowded places.136 These places also 
tend to provide security for patrons and often will have medical 
personnel on standby in case of an emergency.137 In such plac-
 
 132. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (2011) ( listing numerous 
prohibited locations where individuals may not carry guns). 
 133. See generally, e.g., Editorial, Mr. Ridge’s Red-Alert Day, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 2004, at A30 (assuming the need for tight security at a long, nonexclu-
sive list of sensitive places, including airports). 
 134. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-11 (West 2011) (prohibiting firearms in 
any courthouse, absent permission from the presiding judge); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-14-23 (2006) (prohibiting firearms in courthouses). 
 135. See, e.g., Prison Types & General Information, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp ( last visited May 16, 2012) 
(indicating a host of security measures taken at different types of prison  
facilities). 
 136. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.2 
(2011) (prohibiting possession of weapons at parades). 
 137. See, e.g., Target Center FAQs, TARGET CTR., http://www.targetcenter 
.com/arena_info/faqs ( last visited May 16, 2012) ( listing information on both 
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es, courts have grounds to examine and uphold these place re-
strictions under intermediate scrutiny by considering the fol-
lowing factors: the strong interest in keeping weapons out; the 
security provided to patrons; the obvious danger that even a 
justified act of self-defense would pose to crowds that may run 
into the tens of thousands; and the limited amount of time one’s 
Second Amendment right is burdened. Strict scrutiny is not 
needed to reach a proper conclusion, and in any case is not the 
proper test because of the limited and indirect nature of the 
burden.138 
Under many state weapon-carry laws, proprietors of pri-
vate property open to the public may also prohibit weapons on 
their premises by giving reasonable notification of their wishes 
to potential patrons.139 Normally, notice is made through a sign 
at the entrance of the establishment.140 Where private parties 
enact such prohibitions on their own property, as they are free 
to do even in the First Amendment context, the courts have a 
limited role to play in protecting the gun owner’s Second 
Amendment interests.141 When the government merely codifies 
the right of the private party to ban weapons on its property, 
the gun owner’s Second Amendment rights are not squarely at 
issue and need not be subjected even to intermediate scrutiny.142 
3. “Place” Restrictions on Self-Defense Anywhere Outside the 
Home 
While one can imagine more places that it might be rea-
sonable to ban firearms in the pursuit of legitimate government 
 
first aid and security procedures at Minnesota Timberwolves games and other 
events). 
 138. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (allowing 
incidental burdens on protected activities to be examined under intermediate 
scrutiny). 
 139. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17) (West 2012). 
 140. See, e.g., id. § 624.714(17)(b)(i). 
 141. Cf. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 650 (2005) (“The exercise of First 
Amendment rights may properly be restricted when the unbridled exercise of 
the right may invade and injure the rights of others, or where the rights are 
used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 142. Cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (noting that 
private businesses enjoy “absolute freedom from First Amendment con-
straints”). But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251 (West Supp. 2011) (enacting a 
compromise solution in the case of an employee who wishes to carry a gun but 
works for an employer who prohibits firearms on the premises by protecting 
the employee from adverse action so long as the gun is secured in the employ-
ee’s car in the parking lot of the business). 
 2012] SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS 2207 
 
goals, the Supreme Court’s declaration that self-defense is the 
core component of the Second Amendment right raises a major 
concern. It is not clear from the language in Heller whether the 
Court intends to protect the right to self-defense beyond the 
home.143 Although Heller describes the need for self-defense as 
“most acute” in the home,144 reliable crime statistics indicate 
that many types of violent crime occur frequently outside the 
home—often more frequently than in the home.145 Moreover, 
only one state, Illinois, currently has a flat prohibition against 
ordinary citizens carrying firearms in public.146 A general 
“place restriction” on the carry of a suitable self-defense weap-
on anywhere outside the home, unmitigated by a meaningful 
opportunity to obtain a permit to do so, may therefore fail to 
meet the standard set by the Supreme Court when it defined 
the right to self-defense.147 
While the great majority of states give a meaningful oppor-
tunity for citizens to vindicate their self-defense rights outside 
the home, most often through a shall-issue permit system, sev-
en states give themselves freedom to tightly control the distri-
bution of weapon-carry permits through may-issue licensing 
 
 143. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (avoiding 
explicit language indicating whether the right to self-defense extends beyond 
the home). 
 144. Id. at 571. 
 145. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2012 (2011) at 205 tbl.323, available at http://www.census.gov/ 
compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0323.pdf (indicating that 68.7% of hate 
crimes occur somewhere other than a residence); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, supra note 123 (indicating that in 2009, 27.4% of burglaries occurred in 
nonresidence locations and 83.1% of robberies occurred outside the home); The 
Offenders, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK (RAINN), http:// 
www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-assault-offenders ( last visited 
May 16, 2012) (noting that sixty percent of rapes occur somewhere other than 
at the victim’s home).  
 146. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4) (West Supp. 2011). 
 147. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[W]e find that [the Second Amendment] 
guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation.”). But see id. at 626 (noting that early commentary and state court 
decisions opined that banning the carry of weapons in public, at least those 
weapons concealed by the bearer, is a permissible government practice be-
cause “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited”). It is 
important to note that the concealed weapons bans the Supreme Court cited 
for this proposition allowed the unconcealed carry of weapons. See Nunn v. 
State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (noting that a law that prohibits concealed carry 
of a weapon must allow for open carry or the law would be void); State v. 
Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489–90 (1850). 
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schemes.148 Unlike shall-issue systems, may-issue regimes al-
low permit-issuing authorities to deny a permit based on non-
objective criteria.149 These states require applicants to convince 
their local sheriff or police departments that they have a justi-
fiable need to carry a weapon before a permit will be issued.150 
Occasionally, the issuing departments or offices will post public 
guidelines about what sorts of needs the issuing law enforce-
ment authority considers justified.151 
Perhaps the most troubling implication for the individual’s 
right to self-defense under a may-issue permit system is that 
the right becomes contingent upon the ability of the applicant 
to convince a government official that one really needs it. In 
free-speech cases, it would be unthinkable to require book pub-
lishers or newspaper editors to show a censorship office that 
they have a “justifiable need” to publish a story, or that they 
possess the “good character” to exercise the right to a free 
press.152 The Supreme Court long ago rejected this type of gov-
ernmental prior restraint on speech as unconstitutional.153  
Similarly, the State should not appoint the police as the 
Censorship Bureau of the Second Amendment. The Supreme 
Court noted in Heller that the Founders decided that all citi-
zens had this “justifiable need” when they codified the Second 
 
 148. See US State Pages, supra note 27 (indicating which states have shall-
issue systems and which have may-issue systems). Alabama, although techni-
cally a may-issue state, does not tightly control the issuance of weapons per-
mits and was therefore not included in this number. BUCKEYE FIREARMS 
ASS’N, supra note 29. 
 149. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150(a)(1)–(2) (West 2012) (requiring 
the applicant demonstrate both “good moral character” as a prerequisites for 
the issuance of a license).  
 150. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011) 
(requiring an investigation into the applicant’s “good and substantial reason” 
to carry a firearm on the person). 
 151. See MD. STATE POLICE LICENSING DIV., HANDGUN PERMIT APPLICATION 
1–2, http://www.mdsp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Q-Q4Mgu_vWs%3d&tabid= 
621&mid=1555 ( last visited May 16, 2012) ( listing various categories of viable 
applicants). The only category of applicants not connected to employment ac-
tivity is personal protection, for which documented evidence of recent victimi-
zation is required. Id. 
 152. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (citations omit-
ted) (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment 
stands against . . . . restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, al-
lowing speech by some but not others.”). 
 153. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 721 (1931) (“The 
statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher 
is permitted to show [in court] . . . that the matter published is true and is 
published with good motives and for justifiable ends.”). 
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Amendment, and the government (or their police delegates) 
may not revisit that policy choice without a constitutional 
amendment.154 Certain objective criteria might be proper 
grounds for the denial of a permit—mental incompetence, crim-
inal record, drug addiction, and the like—and states universal-
ly require that applicants meet these criteria with either type 
of permit-issue system.155 
If the purpose or effect of the state agencies’ decisions is to 
generally deny the right to self-defense to all but a select or fa-
vored few, then—as in cases of speech suppression—these laws 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny because they directly and 
near-categorically burden the right to self-defense.156 Even if 
intermediate scrutiny were applied to restrictive may-issue 
permit regimes—which it should not be—these laws may still 
succumb to judicial review because they do not ensure the 
meaningful opportunity for citizens to exercise their Second 
Amendment rights.157 Under these tightly controlled may-issue 
permitting systems, most people must give up their right to 
self-defense any time they walk out their front door.  
4. Manner Restrictions 
Manner restrictions in the free-speech context can be near-
ly as varied as place restrictions. The government may specify 
anything from the maximum volume of a spoken message158 to 
prohibiting the delivery of the message in an intimidating 
manner.159 Like other incidental burdens to First Amendment 
rights, these restrictions serve other important societal inter-
ests. For example, they protect the listener from undue annoy-
 
 154. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“The very 
enumeration of the [Second Amendment] right takes out of the hands of gov-
ernment . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is 
really worth insisting upon.”). 
 155. E.g. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(1) (Supp. 2011). 
 156. Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99 (noting that when the gov-
ernment enacts laws favoring certain speakers, those laws will be subjected to 
strict scrutiny). United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (suggesting 
its four-factor test for intermediate scrutiny cannot allow governmental sup-
pression of speech). 
 157. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (1989) (requir-
ing such a meaningful opportunity in the First Amendment context). 
 158. See id. at 786–87 (describing the manner restrictions placed upon per-
formances at a public bandshell). 
 159. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (explaining that 
intimidation—where the speaker intends to create a fear of real harm—is not 
protected by the First Amendment). 
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ance, unwanted messages, and intimidation. Therefore, these 
types of burdens will survive intermediate scrutiny as long as 
they are not so broad that they eclipse a meaningful opportuni-
ty to engage in free speech with the intended (and willing) au-
dience. In the First Amendment context, intermediate scrutiny 
of time, place, and manner restrictions does not require that the 
alternatives offered to the speaker to exercise free-speech rights 
are the speaker’s first, or even best, choice for conveying the 
message.160 
Manner restrictions are common in the context of firearms. 
One of the most common manner restrictions is the requirement 
that, while carrying a weapon in public pursuant to a permit, the 
gun must be concealed from plain view.161 Currently, no state 
requires that the gun be carried openly, although several states 
leave it to the permit-holder to decide how to carry.162 
When it comes to the concealment of firearms in public, 
there are indeed reasonable arguments that either open or con-
cealed carry is the “better” option. Requiring a citizen to adver-
tise the fact that she or he is armed by requiring open carry 
may be a bad idea—it may cause alarm in public, make the cit-
izen a target for criminal attack, and it may subject the citizen 
to more danger in a deadly force encounter.163 Likewise, man-
dating the concealment of weapons makes a defensive firearm 
more difficult to draw, which can put a victim at a disad-
vantage in a deadly force encounter where split seconds can 
 
 160. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640, 654–55 (1981) (upholding time, place, and manner restrictions on free 
speech regarding the propagation of religious views at a state fair despite the 
contention that these restrictions created a suboptimal environment in which 
to convey the speakers’ message). 
 161. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.171(3) (West Supp. 2011) (clari-
fying that the license only covers those handguns not discernible to “ordinary 
observation”). 
 162. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(1)(a) (West 2012) (failing to require 
either open or concealed carry under the state-issued license). 
 163. See Robert Mackey, Frommer May Boycott Arizona over Guns, LEDE 
(Aug. 21, 2009, 6:50 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/frommer 
-may-boycott-arizona-over-guns/ (highlighting the potential for public alarm 
from the open carry of weapons, even during a planned political demonstration 
where the demonstrators announced in advance their intention to carry guns); 
Tulsa Police Chief Opposes Open-Carry Proposal, CONNECTAMARILLO.COM 
(Nov. 26, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.connectamarillo.com/news/story.aspx? 
id=546437 (documenting one police chief ’s objections to an open-carry law 
based on these grounds). 
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matter.164 For these reasons, it may be argued that one or the 
other method of carry can expose a victim to more danger un-
der certain circumstances, and thus place an undue burden on 
the self-defense right such that a particular restriction on ei-
ther concealed or open carry should fail intermediate scrutiny. 
Mitigating this supposed burden, however, is the fact that even 
if the choice were left to the individual he or she would still be 
required to assume the set of risks accompanying that choice. 
This, coupled with the fact that under First Amendment juris-
prudence a speaker is not always entitled to his or her first 
choice as to the time, place, and manner of his or her free 
speech165 should mean that the courts should not subject this 
kind of law to strict scrutiny. 
The important point here is that any burden one way or 
the other is probably incidental, meaning that intermediate 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.166 Assuming the 
government offers an important justification for this kind of re-
striction, the restriction would probably survive intermediate 
scrutiny because it does not prevent the meaningful exercise of 
the self-defense right. Therefore, a court would be unlikely to 
characterize the regulation as overbroad. 
Another common manner restriction is that those carrying 
firearms, even with their permits, must not do so while intoxi-
cated by drugs or alcohol.167 This kind of restriction seems emi-
nently reasonable given the effects of such chemicals on the 
brain—particularly the fact that they impair both judgment 
and motor skills.168 The obvious danger of an impaired citizen 
carrying a gun, coupled with the fact that he or she is free at all 
times to abstain from the use of drugs and alcohol, is more than 
 
 164. For an entire article by a well-known firearms instructor dedicated to 
the complexities of drawing a concealed handgun, see Massad Ayoob, Enhanc-
ing the Draw, Part I: Access A Step by Step Approach to a Swifter and Cleaner 
Draw, GUNS MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2005, at 12. 
 165. Horina v. City of Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2008) (“An 
adequate alternative does not have to be the speaker’s first or best choice.” 
(citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna, 452 U.S. at 647)). 
 166. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (describ-
ing the intermediate scrutiny test solely in terms of incidental burdens). 
 167. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-327 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-52 
(Supp. 2011). 
 168. See Matthew C. Rappold, Note, Criminal Law—Evidence of Inactive 
Drug Metabolites in DUI Cases: Using a Proximate Cause Analysis to Fill the 
Evidentiary Gap Between Prior Drug Use and Driving Under the Influence, 32 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 535, 559 (2010) (noting these impairments as 
part of the statutory definition of “intoxicated” in Arkansas). 
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enough justification to deem this kind of manner restriction in-
cidental. Thus, the intermediate-scrutiny test would certainly 
be appropriate.  
Another restriction ordinarily seen in state codes allowing 
individuals to carry firearms in public is a requirement that the 
weapon not be carried in a threatening manner. Such “bran-
dishing” laws seek to prevent threats, intimidation, and alarm 
by specifying that individuals carrying guns in public put them 
in a holster or other container suitable to the carry of a fire-
arm.169 Just like free-speech restrictions prohibiting intimida-
tion, laws like this advance other important interests while 
burdening the underlying fundamental right in only the most 
tenuous sense. As such, the typical brandishing law should only 
be subjected to—and will have little trouble surviving—
intermediate scrutiny. 
As noted earlier, neither strict scrutiny nor intermediate 
scrutiny alone is appropriate to determine the constitutionality 
of many other gun-control laws. Reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions should normally be subjected to intermedi-
ate scrutiny.170 Only when these restrictions become so broad—
alone or in the aggregate—that they no longer represent a mere 
incidental burden on the core Second Amendment right of self-
defense should the government bear the burden of strict  
scrutiny.171 
With its proclamation that the right to keep and bear arms 
is a fundamental right held by the individual that applies 
against the states,172 the judiciary should stand ready to re-
quire a more nuanced approach to gun control that is more def-
erential to this right. While there are many laws on the books 
that are still constitutional—even under this proposed frame-
work—some are not. Laws permanently stripping criminals of 
the right to bear arms may need a more refined examination 
than they are currently given. Reasonable time, place, and 
 
 169. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(8) (West Supp. 2010) 
(making it a crime to display a firearm in a “manner calculated to alarm”).  
 170. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (applying intermediate scrutiny to such a 
restriction). 
 171. Cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (applying in-
termediate scrutiny only to incidental regulation of speech). 
 172. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that 
the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms is applicable to the states); see 
also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the 
home). 
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manner restrictions on the Second Amendment, while permis-
sible, must now account for the fact that Second Amendment 
rights are fundamental and thus cannot be abridged in any way 
the government sees fit.173 Nor should licensing procedures 
present a material obstacle to exercising one’s Second Amend-
ment rights. Courts must be mindful of the burden that such 
restrictions impose; the burden must be justified, and not so 
heavy that there is no longer a meaningful opportunity to exer-
cise the right.174 
III.  EXISTING FREE-SPEECH TESTS CAN PROPERLY 
ADJUDICATE GUN-CONTROL REGULATIONS POST-
HELLER   
Since the Supreme Court decided Heller in 2008, courts 
and commentators have wrestled with the issue of whether 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some other test should 
be used to resolve Second Amendment challenges.175 There is 
concern among interested parties that one test or the other will 
tend to lead to the “right” or “wrong” line of decisions regarding 
individual gun rights.176 While there is nothing wrong with ar-
guing that the Court should adopt doctrines that protect both 
rights and restrictions that are uncontroversial, it is important 
to remember that the Court has already crafted the tools need-
ed to adjudicate these cases—and they work. 
Both strict and intermediate scrutiny are indispensible in 
resolving the plethora of issues likely to come before the judici-
ary in the near future. The key to determining which test to use 
is as simple as determining whether the burden on the right is 
direct or incidental. And the method to determine whether a 
regulation’s burden is direct or incidental is just as simple: If 
law-abiding citizens wishing to arm themselves obey the chal-
lenged restriction, is there a reasonable likelihood that at the 
moment of a criminal attack the victims will be without imme-
diate access to a weapon because they obeyed the law? If the 
answer is yes, the burden is direct; if the answer is no, the bur-
den is incidental. Such a test would serve an appropriately sim-
 
 173. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (requiring the furtherance of an im-
portant state interest in order to pass intermediate scrutiny). 
 174. See id. 
 175. E.g., Kiehl, supra note 52, at 1133 (describing how courts have not 
reached a consensus on how to resolve Second Amendment challenges after 
Heller). 
 176. See, e.g., id. at 1169–70.  
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ilar purpose to subjecting content-based restrictions to strict 
scrutiny in the First Amendment arena.177 Courts should then 
apply the appropriate test to the regulation, and let it stand or 
fall as the analysis dictates. 
This proposal is likely to cause concerns on both sides of 
the gun debate. Those who advocate for stronger gun-control 
measures believe that strict scrutiny is too “hard” of a test for 
gun-control regulations to pass, while those who argue for more 
robust self-defense rights think that intermediate scrutiny is 
too “easy.”178 These concerns fail to take into account that the 
practicalities of these tests in the Second Amendment context 
will almost certainly mean that gun-control regulations will 
have an easier time surviving strict scrutiny, and a more diffi-
cult time surviving intermediate scrutiny, than their First 
Amendment counterparts. 
A. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON STRICT AND INTERMEDIATE 
SCRUTINY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MIGRATE WELL FROM THE 
FREE-SPEECH CONTEXT TO THE SELF-DEFENSE CONTEXT 
In Part II, this Note asserted that the sky will not fall if 
strict scrutiny is applied to laws denying possession of firearms 
to criminals and the insane because the “strict in theory, fatal 
in fact” maxim of strict scrutiny could hardly apply in the Se-
cond Amendment context. Compelling justifications for race-
based policy and speech suppression are rare.179 Finding a 
compelling justification to deny firearms to violent felons, and 
perhaps even lesser criminals, on the other hand, is unlikely to 
give courts much pause. 
An ex-convict obeying a conviction-based dispossession law 
is clearly suffering a direct infringement on the right to bear 
arms because it is not only likely, but certain, that he or she 
will be without immediate access to a weapon in the event of a 
violent attack. The fact that strict scrutiny is the appropriate 
test hardly means the law should be invalidated. Rather, it 
 
 177. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000) (applying this test to content-based restrictions). 
 178. See generally Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 52, at 463 (noting that 
each side implicitly takes issue with a particular level of scrutiny on these 
grounds). 
 179. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (finding a race-
based school admissions policy was justified by a compelling-government in-
terest); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (finding race-
based denial of civil rights during wartime was justified by a compelling gov-
ernment interest). 
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should be relatively uncontroversial for courts to accept the 
government’s public safety justifications as compelling because 
of the connection between past violent behavior and the risk of 
future violence.180 
It is true that the earlier analysis did not take into account 
the second prong (least burdensome restriction) of the strict-
scrutiny test in testing lifetime bans on possession. This prong, 
however, does not present a significant hurdle to this type of 
gun-control legislation because the government can easily re-
strict these bans only to those groups to which they may be 
constitutionally applied.181 Despite the application of strict 
scrutiny to these laws, the Supreme Court’s adoption of this 
proposed framework of adjudication will not leave society with 
rules permitting violent criminals access to firearms. 
There is a similar failure of traditional logic when looking 
to the practical implications of intermediate scrutiny between 
the free speech and firearms contexts. One important difference 
between the burden on free speech rights and the burden on 
self-defense rights under the intermediate-scrutiny test is that 
an individual wishing to express a message in a certain time, 
place, or manner will often have a meaningful alternative op-
portunity to reach the intended audience, even if his or her pre-
ferred time, place, or manner of expressing that message is 
prohibited.182 A citizen who wishes to defend him or herself 
from criminal attack, on the other hand, can never really be 
certain when he or she will become a victim.183 Because of this 
dilemma faced by the potential victim, a citizen seriously con-
cerned about defending him or herself from a life-threatening 
attack will need to arm himself as part of a daily routine: if he 
 
 180. See generally LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 71 (noting that violent of-
fenders are highly likely to seriously reoffend shortly following release from 
prison). 
 181. It is certainly possible that the extreme length of the ban imposed by 
these laws may fail strict scrutiny’s least-restrictive burden prong. However, 
the lengthy analysis required to properly determine the constitutional legiti-
macy of a lifetime ban on possession, as opposed to a three-, five-, or ten-year 
ban, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 182. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 183. See Charlie Savage & Eric Lipton, Real Threats Are Said to Rarely 
Give Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A14 (describing such difficulty in 
determining if, where, and when a violent attack might take place, even when 
government authorities attempt to protect high-level politicians). 
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does not, then at the moment the criminal strikes, he will be 
unable to fight back.184 
This is an important distinction from free speech where, for 
example, long laundry lists of prohibited places are commonly 
seen as permissibly allowing speakers an ample alternative op-
portunity to deliver their message.185 In the Second Amend-
ment context, these lengthy prohibitions could easily be too 
broad to allow a meaningful opportunity to exercise one’s self-
defense rights, and therefore transform the burden from inci-
dental to direct,186 and changing the proper test from interme-
diate scrutiny to strict scrutiny. Thus, just as the compelling 
justification prong of strict scrutiny need not always be ex-
tremely difficult to support in the Second Amendment context, 
the meaningful alternative opportunity portion of the interme-
diate-scrutiny test may occasionally prove more difficult here 
than it would in a First Amendment challenge. 
This is not to say that incidental burdens should always, or 
even frequently, be invalidated under this framework on ac-
count of the meaningful alternative opportunity portion of the 
intermediate-scrutiny test. Indeed, as the backstop to the 
threshold scrutiny question of whether a burden is direct or in-
cidental, failure of the meaningful alternative opportunity 
prong only really means that the proper test was not really in-
termediate scrutiny in the first place, but rather strict scruti-
ny.187 In fact, most of the restrictions for which intermediate 
scrutiny is the proper test will have little trouble surviving. 
Public safety is frequently going to be an applicable and im-
portant government justification for gun restrictions, and the 
over breadth requirement is probably capable of being legislat-
ed around, even if it does invalidate the occasional incidental 
regulation. 
 
 184. See id. (noting the apparent lack of predictability in the violent shoot-
ing attack against Representative Gabrielle Giffords and others in Arizona). 
 185. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.60(c) 
(Supp. 2012) (prohibiting certain types of begging within, among other places, 
ten feet of any crosswalk; at any restroom; within eighty feet of any automatic 
teller machine; within ten feet of any convenience store; within ten feet of any 
gas station; or within fifty feet of any park).  
 186. See id. It would be nearly impossible for anyone lawfully carrying a 
firearm to move from place to place, let alone go about their day, without vio-
lating the law in a city imposing such place restrictions on the carry of weap-
ons. See id. 
 187. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 790–91 (1989) (requiring ample alternative op-
portunity to deliver a message in order to uphold incidental speech restrictions 
in the First Amendment context).  
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B. GOVERNMENT ASSERTIONS OF COMPELLING PUBLIC-SAFETY 
INTERESTS MUST ACCOUNT FOR DANGERS INHERENT IN THE 
RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE 
Once a court decides to apply either strict or intermediate 
scrutiny to a particular law, there are still important questions 
as to how the states may (or may not) justify the survival of a 
particular law under a specified level of review. This Section 
examines a key argument likely to arise between individuals 
and the State: How important are government obligations to 
improve public safety in light of the unavoidable dangers a 
right to armed self-defense presents? 
The prime justification for most gun-control laws in the 
United States, whether explicit or implicit, is the general need 
of the government to prevent violence.188 Almost all of these 
laws, however, were written long before the Supreme Court de-
clared the Second Amendment an individual, fundamental 
right.189 In light of Heller and McDonald, the method of justify-
ing these laws may need to be reexamined.190 
The Second Amendment clearly creates a serious potential 
for violence in America, just as the First Amendment creates 
the possibility that the Ku Klux Klan will spread a message of 
violence in pursuit of its racially bigoted goals.191 As much as 
one would like to wish away the problem of violence, which is 
inextricably entwined with the right of gun ownership, it is 
clear that where one goes, the other may follow. It is no solu-
tion to say that the problems that attend this constitutional poli-
 
 188. E.g., Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–31 (2006 & Supp. 2011)) (written in 
1968) (“The Congress hereby declares that the purpose of this title is to pro-
vide support to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials in their fight 
against crime and violence . . . .”); see, e.g., Public Safety and Recreational 
Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110102–03, 108 Stat. 
1996, 1996–99 (1994) (banning, in the interest of public safety, the transfer 
and possession of “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s]” and certain 
semiautomatic rifles and shotguns deemed to be “assault weapons”). 
 189. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–31; National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 38 Stat. 
1236 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 I.R.C.). 
 190. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008) 
(striking down the Washington, D.C., handgun ban and inoperability require-
ments that had stood since the 1970s), with McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. 
Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (extending the Heller holding by incorporating the Se-
cond Amendment against the states). 
 191. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
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cy choice should be grounds for direct infringements of the right 
in question.192 
In other contexts—even in the context of the First 
Amendment—citizen safety is clearly of the utmost importance 
and can even justify the survival of a law that is examined by 
the skeptical eye of the strict-scrutiny test.193 But the very na-
ture of the right to keep and bear arms necessarily reflects a 
policy choice made during the founding era.194 The Second 
Amendment simply does not permit the general possibility of 
unlawful violence—which unquestionably attends the right of 
the average citizen to own a gun—to be used by the govern-
ment as the very justification to take that right away.195 This 
argument would be akin to saying that because the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement will allow some guilty crim-
inals to go free—perhaps free to commit further violent 
crimes—the government has a compelling public safety interest 
in effectively dispensing with it. The position that such an ar-
gument advances, in either context, is really that the ratifica-
tion of the amendment was a poor policy decision that the legis-
lature may override by mere statute. It is important that the 
judiciary makes clear that these constitutional policy decisions 
may not be revisited by the states until they collectively choose 
to repeal or modify the Second Amendment.196 
 
 192. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (noting that the government may not vio-
late enshrined constitutional rights in order to combat the problem of gun vio-
lence in the United States). 
 193. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (noting that suppression of speech 
is justifiable where the government seeks to prevent “imminent lawless ac-
tion”); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 
(2010) (“Everyone agrees that the Government’s interest in combating terrorism 
is an urgent objective of the highest order.”); R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (noting that the suppression of “fighting words,” defama-
tion, and obscenity can all be proper justification for content-based regulation). 
 194. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (“[T]he enshrinement of constitutional 
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”). 
 195. See id. 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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This is not to say that public-safety concerns should never, 
or even infrequently, be proper justification for laws directly in-
fringing on core Second Amendment rights. Rather, in impos-
ing requirements on the government to justify its compelling 
interests in the strict-scrutiny context, courts should exclude a 
reasonably acceptable amount of danger from their calculus 
when determining whether the public-safety interest is compel-
ling. This idea is usefully reduced to a simple formula: 
 
P – A ≥ C 
 
In this equation: P represents the overall public-safety con-
cern absent the infringement; A represents some acceptable 
level of danger to society that courts should subtract from the 
government’s overall justification argument because that dan-
ger cannot be avoided while still respecting the right to self-
defense; and C represents a showing of a compelling state in-
terest. If, after courts account for the acceptable amount of 
danger, the remainder of the government’s argument still rais-
es a compelling public safety concern, then courts should recog-
nize that the government interest is compelling. As was shown 
in the example of possession bans based on criminal history, 
this is not always a difficult argument to make. 
In contrast, under the intermediate-scrutiny test, the gen-
eral need of the government to control violence need not be 
more carefully examined as a proper justification for an inci-
dental restriction on the self-defense right. The constitutional 
dictates of the Second Amendment notwithstanding, courts 
must not remain totally blind to the government’s pressing re-
sponsibility to keep people safe.197 More importantly, because 
incidental restrictions, by definition, still allow a relatively 
complete opportunity for citizens to exercise their self-defense 
rights, there is little need to require the government to account 
for a certain minimal level of danger in justifying such burdens. 
In fact, such legislation should be welcomed as a method to re-
duce the dangers that tend to follow the right to armed self-
defense without severely abridging that right.198 
 
 197. This is implicitly recognized in the conclusion of Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
 198. The government must still show that the regulation is narrowly tai-
lored. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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C. A HYBRID APPROACH IS REASONABLE BECAUSE IT REACHES 
REASONABLE RESULTS 
American courts will likely see a significant amount of liti-
gation seeking to define the scope of the Second Amendment.199 
Individuals and gun-rights organizations will likely seek to 
push the right to its outer bounds, while some states and their 
pro-gun-control amici will seek to justify various firearm regu-
lations to the judiciary—within constitutional constraints. As 
circuit splits and erroneous federal appellate decisions arise, 
the Supreme Court will hear some of these cases. The Court 
has doctrines to examine the constitutionality of these regula-
tions found in its First Amendment jurisprudence; indeed, the 
Court itself has hinted that it may use them in the coming 
years.200 
In setting the standards of review, not all gun regulation 
needs to be treated in the same way. Laws that seek to deny, 
discourage, or unduly burden firearm ownership under the 
guise of general safety must be presumed invalid, and only the 
most compelling needs of the state may overcome the individu-
al’s interest in vindicating the self-defense right. This general 
principle is predicated on the recognition that the Constitution 
accepts that some social cost—including violence—will attend 
the general right of self-defense, and the founders chose that 
evil over the evils of a population denied the right to keep and 
bear arms.201 Even where the government demonstrates a com-
pelling need to prohibit gun ownership, such laws must be tai-
lored to create only the slightest burden that the need justi-
fies.202 Laws giving state officials vague or subjective discretion 
to deny permits; regulatory schemes creating unreasonable de-
lay, expense, or complication prior to legal possession or carry 
of firearms; excessive time, place, or manner restrictions gen-
erally impeding the ability to legally defend oneself; and laws 
permanently stripping gun rights based on a minor or nonvio-
 
 199. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (explaining that this is the Court’s first in-
depth review of the Second Amendment, and that there will be time later to 
refine the scope of the amendment). 
 200. See id. at 582, 591, 595, 635 ( likening the First Amendment in several 
respects to the Second Amendment). 
 201. See id. at 634–36 (recognizing the clear potential for violence at-
tendant in private gun ownership, but deferring to states’ choices regarding 
whether or not to ratify the Second Amendment). 
 202. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 
(2000) (requiring the government prove that less intrusive regulation of content-
based speech restrictions are not sufficient to achieve a compelling interest). 
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lent criminal record should all fall into this category. And they 
should not survive. 
On the other hand, where government regulations advanc-
ing safety or other reasonable needs of society do not greatly 
burden the right to self-defense, courts should rightly relax the 
standard of review.203 In such cases, the government need only 
demonstrate an important interest unrelated to the denial of 
the right to bear arms and narrowly tailor the laws so that the 
right to defend oneself can still be meaningfully exercised.204 
Laws imposing objective licensing procedures that are reasona-
ble as to their approval time, complication, and expense, and 
restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms that are reason-
able as to their time, place, and manner should be reviewed, 
and frequently upheld, under this standard. 
  CONCLUSION   
Undoubtedly, there will be points of contention not readily 
addressed by current First Amendment doctrines or the pro-
posals in this Note. The Supreme Court may need to borrow 
from other jurisprudence, different areas of the law, or invent 
new doctrines out of whole cloth, as the need arises. For the 
time being, though, it is enough that an existing framework for 
adjudicating Second Amendment issues is practically already 
in place and that both the people and the government already 
understand it. 
Converting First Amendment scrutiny doctrines to cover 
new Second Amendment jurisprudence will allow courts to use 
a time-tested review standard that is readily adaptable to this 
newly redefined right. Further, doing so will add legitimacy to 
future adjudications of a highly polarizing issue, especially in 
this late date for the doctrine of incorporation. It will also pre-
vent unnecessary missteps and fumbling in the early days of 
the new Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
 
 203. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (allowing the government to burden, if 
not suppress, free speech in an effort to advance other important societal  
interests). 
 204. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (requiring 
such restrictions to meet these standards). 
